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Common ground is most often understood as the sum of mutually known beliefs,
knowledge, and suppositions among the participants in a conversation. It explains why
participants do not mention things that should be obvious to both. In some accounts of
communication, reaching a mutual understanding, i.e., broadening the common ground,
is posed as the ultimate goal of linguistic interactions. Yet, congruent with the more
pragmatic views of linguistic behavior, in which language is treated as social coordination,
understanding each other is not the purpose (or not the sole purpose) of linguistic
interactions.This purpose is seen as at least twofold (e.g., Fusaroli et al., 2014): to maintain
the systemic character of a conversing dyad and to organize it into a functional synergy
in the face of tasks posed for a dyadic system as a whole. It seems that the notion of
common ground is not sufﬁcient to address the latter character of interaction. In situated
communication, in which meaning is created in a distributed way in the very process of
interaction, both common (sameness) and privileged (diversity) information must be pooled
task-dependently across participants. In this paper, we analyze the deﬁnitions of common
and privileged ground and propose a conceptual extension that may facilitate a theoretical
account of agents that coordinate via linguistic communication.To illustrate the usefulness
of this augmented framework, we apply it to one of the recurrent issues in psycholinguistic
research, namely the problem of perspective-taking in dialog, and draw conclusions for the
broader problem of audience design.
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INTRODUCTION
Inmost traditional approaches to language, sense-makinghappens
at the individual level. Language itself is seen as an information
carrier, in which vessels for meaning arrive from the speaker, and
are unpacked by the addressee by means of complex computa-
tional processes over pre-existing representations (e.g., Katz, 1966;
Frazier and Clifton, 1996). Even when the dialogical nature of lin-
guistic communication in guiding production and comprehension
is acknowledged, as in recent mechanistic models (Pickering and
Garrod, 2004, 2013), the process of communication has a similar,
information-transmitting character: it’s goal is most often for par-
ticipants to understand each other, which consists of making their
situation models as similar as possible.
Recently, however, an increasing number of approaches have
investigated language in a more ecological setting of situated social
coordination. The approaches vary from more pragmatic ones,
which regard language as a tool for social coordination, to more
radical ones, in which it is the linguistic interaction itself that
temporarily transforms individual cognition and constitutes social
coordination. Neither of these approaches considers understand-
ing each other to be the ultimate goal of an interaction. Rather,
the aim is to form (or to become) a temporary functional system,
jointly structured by environmental requirements1.
1Such a view of the role of language in situated cognition is congruent with Hutchins
(1995) distributed cognition approach, where the focus is the ability of individuals
In a recently proposed model of dialog as interpersonal synergy
(Fusaroli et al., 2014), this systemic and functional character of
linguistic interaction is given a more systematic form. This model
is based on an assumption that language, instead being a system of
meaning carriers is rather a system of constraints on an ongoing,
situated interaction. Due to the historywithin a culture andwithin
development in this culture, language has the power to function-
ally control2 the interaction as a whole (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi and
Scott Kelso, 2008; Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi and Cowley, 2012). Such a
perspective on language, in which interaction in a concrete situ-
ation is constitutive of the meaning of utterances, brings several
major changes to the way explanations of linguistic behaviors are
constructed:
to form collective functional organizations. In this approach, the collective, global
level assumes a systemic property. Both local and global factors in cognition and
action are investigated. When we refer to a ‘system’ in this text, we mean such
an organization of individuals. Obviously, every such organization is situated in a
particular environment that shapes it in different time scales. It is thus possible to
conceive organisms-environment organization as a system as well. This is a matter
of focus. In this paper, we chose to focus on human interaction – mostly dyadic but
scalable to more participants – and treat environmental factors as constraints on
this system.
2“Functional control” is a term in motor control theory (from which the notion
of ‘synergy’ has been adopted). Functional control is exerted through reducing the
degrees of freedom of the parts of the system in a speciﬁc way, enabling a system to
perform a coordinated movement, adequate to an ongoing activity (e.g., Bernstein,
1967).
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• First, global characteristics that pertain to the level of a convers-
ing dyad become a valid source of explanatory variables, on par
with individual cognitive processes. Global and local processes
are in a relationship of co-construction, or circular (recipro-
cal) causality (e.g., Kelso, 1995). Thus, equally important as the
study of individual processes, it is important to study features of
global organization such as task-functionality, stability, dimen-
sionality, reaction to perturbation, etc. These global features can
be related to local, individual processes (behaviors and experi-
ences), which opens ways of understanding and modeling both
the emergence of global characteristics from the local ones and
the transformative effects of interaction on individual cognitive
processes.
• Second, a system created in a conversation is qualitatively new.
The meaning created in a distributed and participatory way can
be neither described nor predicted by the analysis of conceptual
or linguistic knowledge of the participants individually (e.g., De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). It arises in a dynamical, dialogical
relationship between the participants under the constraints of
a situation. The system’s existence and the states it assumes
actualize one of many possible ways to organize a dyad, in direct
contact with environmental constraints.
• Third, congruent with the general notion of synergy, the model
proposes that two distinct mechanisms are necessary for cre-
ating a functional system in dialog. On the one hand, there
are mechanisms responsible for making the system coherent
and sustainable; on the other hand, there are mechanisms for
distributing the roles among the elements of the system to
effectuate a functional coordination (Fusaroli et al., 2014). This
twofold character is manifested both at the physical level of
interaction and on the semantic (or content) level3.
Recent research has uncovered a variety of mechanisms for
maintaining physical coherence in interacting individuals, such
as similarity in time (synchrony) and space (imitation). Some
studies have also investigated mechanisms for physical comple-
mentarity, which involved reciprocity of movement (van Schie
et al., 2008; Sartori et al., 2011) or turn-taking structure (Wilson
and Wilson, 2006). Yet the search for mechanisms that provide
coherence and complementarity on the content level have thus far
been limited to just one part of the story, namely the similarity
aspect, which is, for example, achieved through priming (as in
Pickering and Garrod, 2004), or, less mechanistically, through the
process of grounding dialog in dynamically developed common
ground (Clark, 1996). What seems to be much less developed
is the conceptual apparatus, which could account for seman-
tic complementarity, i.e., for meaningful differences that make
people interact in the ﬁrst place and that are integrated in a dia-
log, resulting in a more capable collective structure. A step in
this direction is research on the emergence of dialogical scripts,
3This distinction might not be easy to make in some embodied accounts of cog-
nition, where physical systems, due to their structure, shaped by natural selection,
can also be seen as meaningful and intentionally committed to projects in the world
(e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 1963). In such embodied view, physical interaction between
the living system and the world, and among systems, can thus also be meaningful.
Being aware of this, we preserve the distinction for the clarity of discourse and pos-
sible connection to research performed in more traditional approaches. See also the
comments in Conclusions.
in which complementary roles develop in the course of task-
oriented interaction (Mills and Gregoromichelaki, 2010; Mills,
2014); however, that research pertains more to the general moves
in conversation (functionally understood), while here we would
like to focus on the semantic resources available for an interacting
dyad.
The aims of this paper are to advocate the need for a conceptual
apparatus that can encompass such semantic complementarity, to
trace established concepts and approaches that can support its
theoretical foundations, and to begin its construction. Realiza-
tion of these aims will require the integration of the synergetic
approach to dialog with more traditional dialog research, which
is the main source of the key concepts. To situate language in
action, we ﬁrst brieﬂy survey the ways in which the relation-
ship between linguistic communication and coordinationhas been
conceptualized, emphasizing pragmatic approaches that repre-
sent an ‘understanding-for-coordination’ perspective. Then, we
determine which conceptual tools are already available to talk
about language in coordination; namely, we analyze the notions
of ‘common’ and ‘privileged’ ground and their respective role in
the explanations of task-oriented linguistic encounters. Next, we
propose that although the notion of dynamically accumulating,
situationally relevant common ground has been indeed a step
towardunderstanding the coordinative role of language in research
on dialog, it is not sufﬁcient to account for the distributed nature
of a conversing system. For this, the notion of ‘pooled ground’
will be advanced to describe resources on which the emerging,
qualitatively new, functional dialogical structure is based. Finally,
we apply this augmented framework to the recurrent problems in
psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology. The case we will ana-
lyze is the debate on perspective-taking in dialog. We show that
what might seem like an automatic egocentric perspective (e.g.,
Keysar et al., 2000, 2003) may stem from the functionality of such
behavior for the dyadic system as a whole. We also reﬂect on the
applicability of the proposed notion to the broader phenomenon
of audience design. The view from the level of interaction prompts
to interpret audience design not only as adapting one’s speech to
the listener so that she better understands it but also as designing
one’s speech to seek what is missing in the speaker’s knowledge
but is crucial for the joint project. Both examples will demonstrate
the explanatory value of the collective level and raise questions
about the proper level of analysis for linguistic structures and
behaviors.
COMMUNICATION: UNDERSTANDING AND COORDINATION
‘Understanding’ is one of the most broadly discussed concepts in
both philosophy and in psychology of language; thus, reviewing,
even superﬁcially, its many facets exceeds the scope of this paper.
Leaving aside the problem of understanding as grasping the mean-
ing of a proposition in its relation to the external world, we will
focus only on understanding in interaction and brieﬂy survey the
ways in which understanding is seen to relate to interpersonal
coordination.
In many traditional approaches to language, understanding
has been treated as a sole goal of linguistic communication. As
Wittgenstein (1967, p. 114) complained: “(. . .) we are so much
accustomed to communication through language, in conversation,
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that it looks to us as if the whole point of communication lay in
this: someone else grasps the sense of my words—which is something
mental: he as it were takes it into his own mind. If he then does
something further with it as well, that is no part of the immediate
purpose of language.” The realization of the goal of understanding
each other was often described as coding and decoding a message
(e.g., Katz, 1966). This made Dummet (1996, p. 97) character-
ize the traditional view as assuming that “communication is (. . .)
essentially like the use of a telephone: the speaker codes his thought
in a transmissible medium, which is then decoded by the hearer (. . .)
Concepts are coded into words and thoughts, which are compounded
out of concepts, into sentences, whose structure mirrors, by and large,
the complexity of the thoughts.”
The ‘code’ conception of language, or a conduit metaphor
of communication (Reddy, 1979), is recently increasingly crit-
icized both in philosophy and in psychology. It seems to fail
in many ways; one of the most important is being unable to
adequately address the issue of contextual ﬂexibility (the same
message could be understood to mean different things in differ-
ent contexts). Without making the context (more precisely, the
relevant features of the context) part of the ‘code,’ a commu-
nication model that consists simply of encoding and decoding
has difﬁculty explaining how the same encoding can at differ-
ent times yield different decodings (Barwise and Perry, 1983;
Krauss and Chiu, 1997). Not of lesser importance is the fact
that, as noted in Wittgenstein’s quote, the code conception of lan-
guage ignores the pragmatic and performative aspects of linguistic
behavior.
Accounts that attempt to embed goals of human communica-
tion in a wider social context and not restrict it only to mutual
understanding have been present in the philosophical literature
for quite a long time. This pragmatic aspect of linguistic com-
munication has been emphasized, for example, in the work of
Hillary Putnam,who indicated that language and linguistic behav-
ior hold a subservient role in the global activity of the users. As he
put it:
“What succeeds or fails is not, in general, linguistic behavior by itself but
total behavior. E.g. we say certain things, conduct certain reasonings with
each other, manipulate materials in a certain way and ﬁnally we have a
bridge that enables us to cross a river that we couldn’t cross before. And our
reasoning and discussion is as much a part of the total organized behavior
complex as it is our lifting of steel girders with a crane. So what I should
really speak of is not the success or failure of our linguistic behavior, but
rather the contribution of our linguistic behavior to the success of our total
behavior (Putnam, 1978, p. 100).”
In pragmatic approaches, the personal and contextual fac-
tors are openly admitted in the process of understanding an
utterance. According to Dascal and Berenstein (2003, p. 83.),
in compliance with Gricean tradition, understanding is always
pragmatic understanding. “It is not a matter only of understand-
ing speaker’s words (determining the “sentence meaning”), but
always a matter of getting to the speaker’s intention in uttering
those words in that context (determining the “speaker’s mean-
ing”).”
Similar debates have been present in analytical philoso-
phy, where utterance comprehension should result, according
to Michael Dummet, in the recognition of interplay between
conventional meaning attributed to words and sentences and the
contextual determinants. The degree to which the former factors
(conventionalized meaning) indeed play the role in the process
of communication also varied in philosophical theories – from
practically determining this process to being always modiﬁed and
dependent on context. As in Davidson (1986, p. 174): “We must
give up the idea of a clearly deﬁned shared structure which language-
users acquire and then apply to cases.”According to Davidson, what
people converge on is only passing theories, and such convergence
is a result of applying all possible resources at hand–both linguistic
and extra-linguistic.
The tension between understanding as a goal in itself or as
a means to coordination is correlated with the tension between
the representative vs. performative functions of language. If the
goal is just to understand each other, the representative function
is emphasized and the process of communication becomes one of
making these representations similar [as in the Pickering and Gar-
rod’s (2004) model]. However, if the language’s function is sought
rather in effectuating coordination, its creative and performative
powers come to the forefront. We ﬁnd a similar distinction in
Dummet (1996, p. 185, 187), who stated that “the true opposition
is between language as representation and language as activity (. . .);
the signiﬁcance of an utterance lies in the difference that it potentially
makes to what subsequently happens.”
The debate sketched above seems to reﬂect, from a philosoph-
ical point of view, the controversies entailed by the relationship
between understanding and overall practical coordination as a
goal of communication. Both understanding and coordination
rely on the similarity of knowledge between the interaction par-
ticipants. However, while understanding each other seems to refer
to and rely on overlapping knowledge, in practical coordination,
the knowledge implicated in the deeds of the partners need not
be entirely common, as long as actions are appropriate. Only if
linguistic interaction is considered ‘for understanding’ can its goal
be described as broadening the scope of mutually shared knowl-
edge; when language use is seen as a control process in an ongoing
interaction, leading to practical coordination, what is mutually
shared is but a foundation on which something new is created
in interaction. The core of the discussion can be thus seen as
a question to what extent successful communication consists in
broadening and strengthening a pre-existing harmony and towhat
extent it consists of efforts that aim to coordinate and overlap sep-
arate idiolects in the goal of creating a new quality under external
constraints.
In philosophical inquiries, it has also been underlined that
one’s comprehension of a given utterance can only be acces-
sible through the manifestation of the state of understanding.
Such an approach allows for a departure from considering under-
standing only as a private, covert, and individual process that
is purely a mental phenomenon. As noted by Quine (1990, p.
58): “In practice, we credit someone with understanding a sentence
if we are not surprised by the circumstances of his uttering it or
by his reaction to hearing it – provided further that his reaction
is not one of visible bewilderment.” Thus, the ‘operationaliza-
tion’ of understanding (success in communication), similar to the
conversational-analytic approaches, is through what happens next
in the overall interaction.
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We will now move to the characterization of these issues
from the psycholinguistic perspective. Counterparts of the above
mentioned problems in psychological and linguistic research on
language involve many issues that appear when pragmatics and
jointness (dialogicity) of language are addressed. In what follows,
we focus on the subset of those issues, surveying the toolbox of
available concepts. We begin with an overview of the notion of
common ground, which constitutes a pivotal concept in address-
ing the above questions on both the theoretical and empirical
level, and then continue to the notion of privileged ground. The
sufﬁciency of these concepts will be evaluated for accounting for
task-oriented dialog.
COMMON AND PRIVILEGED GROUND
The notion of common ground has been most extensively used
and explored in psycholinguistic theories by Clark and Marshall
(1978), Clark et al. (1983), and Clark (1996). Common ground,
deﬁned as a “sum of mutual knowledge, beliefs and suppositions”
(Clark, 1996, p. 93) enables agents to recognize and represent
the general information about the world as well as about previous
states and current situations that is shared among them. This is the
basis for mutual expectations of each other’s behavior in a given
stage of the task (Clark, 1996, pp. 43–49). The most important
feature of common ground is thus the assumption of mutuality.
It is not enough that two people have the same knowledge; they
must realize that this knowledge is mutually shared.
In most psycholinguistic research, common ground has been
treated as a relatively simple characterization of mutually available
information, which would be a prerequisite in communication. In
many experimental settings it is usually operationalized as those
elements of a visual ﬁeld that are accessible to both participants.
Yet it is important to appreciate the complexity of this concept, its
joint, dynamical, and contextualized nature. This has been most
fully exposed in research on dialog, and especially in Clark’s (1996)
approach, where it serves to ground conversation and to enable the
principle of least collaborative effort to explain many aspects of
linguistic interactions.
Clark sees a conversation as a type of rational joint action,
with different levels of joint projects, hierarchically and sequen-
tially organized (Clark, 1996; Bangerter and Clark, 2003, p. 150).
A minimal joint project is understood as an adjacency pair –
a proposal from Agent A to take a joint project and Agent B’s
response to uptake it, like in a typical question–answer pair
(Clark, 1996, pp. 191–220). Linguistic communication is a tool
for the coordination of more basic actions immersed in a physical
world. Some joint actions obviously do not require coordina-
tion via language, like dancing or playing a piano duet, but
in most co-actions language is necessary to succeed. For exam-
ple, when Ann and Bob are engaged in moving a table, they
might use language for navigation in different joint projects that
constitute the joint action, such as selecting a place to put it,
lifting the table, lowering it together, etc. Bangerter and Clark
(2003) noticed that sounds or words produced during conversa-
tion, which were traditionally considered to be turn-taking signals
or emotional acts may in fact reﬂect the structure of the joint
task, as for example, they may serve as markers that indicate the
stage of the project. They analyzed corpora from experimental
communication tasks and spontaneous telephone conversations
(over 3.5millionwords inEnglish andGerman) to show thatwords
like “okay” and“all right” served as horizontal markers (indicating
the beginning and end of a particular joint project), and “m-hm,”
“u-huh,”“yeah” were vertical markers (signalizing the expectation
of continuation).
Although communication serves as a coordination device for
joint actions, it itself needs to be coordinated. Interlocutors partic-
ipate in a collaborative process (grounding) where they constantly
signalize to each other their engagement in a course of events. As
Clark (1996, p. 246) noticed, in the grounding process, new infor-
mation is prominent when it concerns the basic level of action
(in physical world or in speech act), but signals pertaining to the
level of understanding “should be backgrounded.”Usually, agents
involved in a joint action need to signalize if they ﬁnish or start
a new project to maintain continuity and compatibility in a track
of joint projects, but they tacitly assume that they accomplished
the level of mutual understanding. Their assumptions might be
easily violated if the other party’s behavior is not in line with
expectations that emerged in the communication process (con-
gruent with Quine’s (1990) characterization above, behavior in
co-action is thus the ﬁnal criterion for ascribing understanding).
These expectations, though not explicitly expressed, are part of
the common ground. They are built on three types of informa-
tion: initial common ground (mutual knowledge that participants
bring into a conversation), the current state of the joint activity,
and public events that happened from the beginning of the joint
action (Clark, 1996, p. 43).
Cumulative history of dialog with another person forms back-
ground information that dynamically creates a shared context.
It may, for example, cause shaping utterances from long and
informative to short and elliptical (Mills and Gregoromichelaki,
2010; Mills, 2011), or even result in less care in the pronunciation
of words that have been mutually used in a given conversation
(Fowler, 1988). The tendency to make a conversation shorter and
more succinct in a shared context is consistent with the least col-
laborative effort principle (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). This
principle has been evoked mostly in situations in which par-
ticipants must agree on a reference, in order to explain how
redundancy is kept minimal. For example, in a communication
game when a director has to provide the matcher with informa-
tion about the shape of tangrams (highly ambiguous, geometrical
ﬁgures), his ﬁrst descriptions are relatively long and detailed,
but in subsequent rounds they become shorter, up to almost
becoming proper names. The speaker does not have to use long
utterances anymore because the dyad has developed ways to con-
ceptualize and refer to the tangrams (Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark,
1992).
Accumulated common ground on the level of conceptu-
alization is also responsible for the phenomenon called lex-
ical entrainment, where a speaker refers in the same way
to the same object in the interaction with the same inter-
locutor but might change the term in a conversation with
another interlocutor (Brennan and Clark, 1996). This is also
an example of applying the least collaborative effort princi-
ple (changing a referring term for the same pair without a
good reason is in conﬂict with the conversational economy,
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Metzing and Brennan, 2003). Similarly, the act of perspective-
taking in conversation may be useful in minimalizing the cost
of future possible misunderstandings. If the interlocutors are
aware that their visual perspectives differ, they will try to
use terms that refer to neutral spatial descriptions (Schober,
1998).
Other aspects of commonground, understood as a sharedphys-
ical, social, and linguistic environment in a current state of activity,
might explain how interlocutors are able to properly interpret
utterances that are strongly context-dependent, such as deﬁnite
references. When Ann says to Tom, “Give me the bottle,” she
most likely means the one that they both have seen or talked
about previously, so Tom can safely reject interpretations that
refer to his private bottle of water hidden in his bag4. Depend-
ing on the recognition of what is and what is not in common
ground, the addressee may narrow the interpretations to those
related to the speaker’s knowledge and their shared history of
communication.
Thus, ‘common ground’ is a very broad construct. It focuses on
everything that is recognizably shared in a conversation. Especially
as construed inClark’s theory, its incremental, dynamic, dialogical,
and situated character makes it a very useful notion for explaining
how people zoom in on common references or resolve ambigui-
ties with least collective effort (e.g.,Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark, 1992;
Clark, 1996; Clark and Krych, 2004). Equally important, it helps
determine what information would be new, i.e., what is worth vol-
unteering in a next conversational move and worth entering into
the accumulating common ground. According to Grice’s coop-
erative principle, the volunteered information must be based on
common ground to be relevant to the course of discussion, but it
must be novel enough to be a real contribution to the conversa-
tion. Saying something that actually is a part of mutual knowledge
is a violation of the quantity maxim, and in usual conversation,
it may turn into an implicature, such as in a situation when Bob
ﬂirts with a woman andAnn says to him: “I think you have a wife.”
However, even this dynamic, task-oriented, and joint concep-
tion of common ground does not allow to address the comple-
mentary parts of knowledge that remain private but nevertheless
inﬂuence how a dyad is coordinating on the task. By focusing on
what is common, mutually shared, the notion of common ground
emphasizes the similarity (or coherence) aspect of the formed
synergy. This, perhaps, stems from the historical provenience: the
main theoretical focus of work on common ground was how peo-
ple establish a common reference to external objects and much
less on the distributed aspects of joint actions. The least collabo-
rative effort principle does point to the fact that one interlocutor
counts on the knowledge of the other, but it is mainly the shared
knowledge. The principle was designed rather to explain curbing
redundancy in speech acts than to make possible the distribu-
tion of resources, which, after all, also (if not primarily) leads to
performing the tasks with least collective effort.
The synergetic approach may be useful to augment the task-
immersed dialog theory with this distributive aspect by more
4In the light of what follows, however, it is possible that if Tom knows that the
hidden bottle better suits the purpose of Ann, he could reach for it (or direct his
gaze toward it), even knowing that Ann refers to a commonly known bottle.
clearly relating the ‘linguistic’ and ‘action’ projects in Clark’s
approach. It proposes a speciﬁc relationship between the joint
projects on the level of action and on the level of conversation. Bas-
ing on the notion of language as a constraint (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi
and Scott Kelso, 2008; Pattee and Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2012), in
this model the moves in a dialog are not viewed as containers for
the transmitted content but rather as constraints on a collective
project. Given the joint nature of linguistic interaction, these are
jointly constructed. Thus the dynamics of both individual and
joint action is regulated and guided by language rather than being
expressed or described in it.
The controlling role of language in collective projects thus
requires a joint establishment of task-relevant constraints using
linguistic structures. This means that these two projects cannot
really be understood separately: being ‘just’ a constraint, an utter-
ance can be understood only in context of the ongoing project,
as it relies for meaning on the action it constrains (Pattee and
Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2012; Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2014). The two
sides of a linguistic interaction: a joint pragmatic project and
joint construction of constraints might nevertheless rely on differ-
ent mechanisms and may provide different sources of structuring
for a conversation. Thus an appearance of a given utterance at
a given moment of interaction may reﬂect both the structure of
the task and the conventionalized ways of structuring linguistic
interactions so that they become effective controls in interaction.
The proposed constraining relationship between language and
coordination in situated coaction leads in many cases to similar
predictions as Clark’s grounding theory. For example the above-
mentioned shortening of expressions and increase in the use of
ellipsis in the course of a conversation stem from the fact that
less control is needed when more coordination is already in place.
However, beyond that, accepting the constraining role of language
(rather than content-conveying one) also facilitates seeing linguis-
tic behaviors as serving a larger, distributed system. Conceptual
pacts are good examples of a dyad zooming in on effective con-
trols in a given situation; the process of emergence of the dialogical
scripts can be seen in the light of their stabilizing participant’s roles
in frequently recurring joint projects. The latter can take place both
on the timescale of a particular interaction in a particular task (as,
e.g., in Mills, 2011) and on the slower timescale, when culturally
speciﬁc dialogical scripts emerge, revealing frequent structures of
joint projects encountered in the social life of a particular culture
(such as, for example, question–answer adjacency pairs, or “greet-
ing chats,”whichmayhave particular structures, cadence, and even
limited contents, e.g., “weather chats” in England, or asking about
the health of relatives in Poland).
Another good example of joint establishing of task-dependent
effective linguistic controls comes from research on language func-
tioning in joint decision making: e.g., Fusaroli et al. (2012) show
that performance on a joint decision task depended not on unspe-
ciﬁc lexical alignment of the participants, but rather on the dyad’s
selecting-by-alignment of speciﬁc dimensions that were crucial for
the task. Repetitive expressions of those dimensions, in turn, kept
the actions of the participants organized around them. Impor-
tantly for the arguments presented in this paper, they would do so
even if actual actions and knowledge, on which the use of those
expressions was based, were idiosyncratic to each participant.
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It is important to reiterate that the principle of least collabora-
tive effort pertains to both levels of coordination: coordination of
controls (where only minimally needed constraints for the ongo-
ing interaction are jointly provided, and where partners count on
each other tomake constraintsmore precise) and the coordination
of a joint project itself, when participants rely on being similar but
also on each other’s idiosyncratic capabilities in the division of
labor. These capabilities (skills and knowledge) might be comple-
mentary and remain unshared, as long as they do the job required
for the project.
The idiosyncratic knowledge in linguistic interaction is referred
to as privileged ground. While the concept of common ground
has a long tradition in philosophy and psycholinguistics, the con-
cept of privileged ground is relatively new and has been used
in more limited contexts. It was construed in opposition to the
common ground and is deﬁned as knowledge that a single inter-
locutor attributes only to herself (for example, because she has
privileged perceptual access to it; see e.g., Keysar et al., 1998).
In many examples of linguistic analyses of communicative inter-
actions and in psycholinguistic research, privileged information
is usually seen as a distractor, drawing attention away from the
common ground on which the interaction should stay, as dic-
tated by the experimental tasks. If an interlocutor cannot ignore
distractors present in privileged ground effectively, it is usu-
ally concluded that she shows an egocentric tendency (Keysar
et al., 1998, 2000, 2003; Wardlow Lane et al., 2006; Lin et al.,
2010).
Constructing tasks in this way, however, researchers limit the
applicability of their results to only a subset of everyday com-
munication situations — a subset, let us add, that is compatible
with the view of ‘understanding’ as ‘equalizing world models.’ In
a way, the privileged information is made irrelevant by design. Yet
if the distributed character of interactions is to be taken seriously,
the importance of role-division and idiosyncratic contributions
to the task become evident, and, with it, the importance of the
privileged ground and the ways of making the relevant elements
of it bear on the task. Focusing on privileged information by an
individual in interaction thus becomes a necessity, a desired thing,
not an imperfection of the participant. The question, in such a
distributed framework, is thus not how the common ground is
broadened for understanding but how both common and relevant
privileged information can be used in collaboration on a realized
project5.
It seems that neither the notion of common ground nor priv-
ileged ground are sufﬁcient to account for this kind of diverse
but complementary inﬂuence that the participants can exert on
joint projects within a distributed system. If linguistic interaction
is to effectuate the coordination of a dyad toward various projects
according to the least collaborative effort principle, it has to realize
the division of labor: i.e., optimally using both parties’ resources,
without making them common.
5In this paper we make a strong assumption that collaboration is our species’ most
prevalent mode. This does not preclude local competition and diversity – because in
the slower time-scale they lead to more ﬂexibility and better exploration of possibili-
ties. Recently it seems increasingly popular to accept that the collective-collaborative
level can be selected for as well (Christakis and Fowler, 2009; Smaldino, 2014).
A similar aspect of collectivity in meaning creation through
constraint construction is also visible on slower time scales and
larger systems: one can recall here Hilary Putnam’s view on how
the meaning of words is distributed in populations. He intro-
duced the notion of division of linguistic labor, relating it to
the performance and coordination of real-life tasks via linguistic
means: “(. . .) it is certainly not necessary or efﬁcient that every-
one who has occasion to buy or wear gold be able to tell with
any reliability whether something is really gold. The foregoing facts
are just examples of mundane division of labor (. . .). But they
engender a division of linguistic labor: everyone to whom gold is
important for any reason has to acquire the word ‘gold’; but he
does not have to acquire the method of recognizing if something
is or is not gold. He can rely on a subclass of speakers. (. . .)
that collective body divides the ‘labor’ of knowing and employing
these various parts of the ‘meaning’ of ‘gold’” (Putnam, 1975, p.
141).
Returning to dyadic interactions and faster time-scales: a
concept is thus needed that can account for the dyad’s abil-
ity to rely on the knowledge of both participants, however,
without the condition of its mutuality. Such knowledge can
be a basis for complementary behaviors in a task situation
(as agents act on the basis of common and private knowl-
edge) and for linguistic acts that may not necessarily reveal or
convey information but also signalize responsibility for privi-
leged knowledge and scout for possibly relevant information.
An expression dictated by an individual’s privileged ground may
thus become an active control of the dyad’s behavior, which
means that information, which does not enter common ground
might nevertheless be decisive for interaction. Thus the pro-
posed concept should pertain to a dyad as a whole and should
help understand the resource in which the dyad’s behavior is
grounded.
POOLING THE GROUND – A VIEW FROM INTERACTION
The view of language as a constraint on social coordination
poses the creation of functional synergy, not understanding
itself as the main explanans. The main questions thus con-
cern how language facilitates coordination of cognition and
action in concrete situations, how it controls and disambiguates
possible ways of knowing and acting. In a sense, thus, it
is not the context that disambiguates the word senses, as
in traditional information-processing approaches, but rather
utterances in a situation that actualize certain possibilities for
interpretation and action and thus ‘disambiguate’ the con-
text (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi and Scott Kelso, 2008; Collier, 2014).
Expressions do not convey meanings but rather, once used, oper-
ate reﬂexively, contributing to the common context andorganizing
experience.
This aspect of human interaction parallels the notion of reﬂex-
ivity applied by Garﬁnkel (1967) in his ethnomethodological
studies on practical everyday activities. Garﬁnkel (1967, p. 8)
emphasized that it is commonly “treated as the most passing mat-
ter of fact that members’ accounts, of every sort, in all their logical
modes, with all of their uses, and for every method for their assembly
are constituent features of the settings they make observable.” On
this view, reﬂexivity means that members shape action in relation
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to context, while the context itself is constantly redeﬁned through
action6.
Thus in such ‘view from interaction,’ linguistic expressions,
always immersed in co-action, effectuate dynamic changes both
in individual participants (according to their history in a given
culture) and on the level of a dyad, where they control interac-
tants’ behavior in a dialogical process. Congruent with the third
claim of the synergetic approach mentioned in introduction, the
formation of such a functional distributed system requires both
coherence of a dyad (to be a system at all) and complementarity –
i.e., the division of labor, which allows for an optimal use of the
resources of each participant.
The key issue for understanding language use in dialog is to
identify the mechanisms, i.e., processes both on the individual and
interaction level, due towhich coherence and complementarity are
realized7. In the case of physical aspects of human interactions, an
increasing amount of evidence for the existence of mechanisms
for maintaining coherence is described in developmental contexts
where infants focus on, imitate and synchronize with adults (Melt-
zoff andMoore,1977;Murray andTrevarthen,1985; Johnson et al.,
1991) and in adults (Schmidt et al., 1990; Shockley et al., 2003).
Not requiring division of labor, these mechanisms function alike
in different contexts, perhaps differing in strength, when, e.g., the
need for social coherence is greater (for discussion on this point,
see also Fusaroli et al., 2014). In linguistic interactions, onemecha-
nism proposed for achieving similarity is priming, with its various
types (semantic, syntactic, etc.).
However, mechanisms that realize the coordination of diver-
sity in interaction, i.e., those that bring about division of labor,
complementarity, ﬂexibility, and compensation, are not as self-
sufﬁcient. They cannot be described without taking into account
a speciﬁc situation of interaction. Complementarity is a com-
plex relational concept that involves not only the cognitions
and actions of participants but puts those in relation to a sit-
uation in which the interacting participants are immersed. On
a physical level, mechanisms for achieving complementarity in
human coaction are being uncovered. Early education of atten-
tion for co-action is visible in development (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi
et al., 2013), as well as early signs of complementary action in
anticipation to the caretaker’s movements (Reddy et al., 2013),
6Authors are grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pointing out this afﬁnity.
Indeed, there are more parallels between the view of language as social coordina-
tion advocated here and Garﬁnkel’s ethnomethodology. Perhaps most importantly,
Garﬁnkel treats all utterances as indexical, therefore under-deﬁned and always rely-
ing on the context of co-action. This under-deﬁnition is a key element in the
framework that treats language as a system of replicable constraints on interactive
events.
7Here, by ‘mechanisms’ we mean processes that are sources of forces that make the
coherence and complementarity possible. The trouble, however, is that in the case of
such multisystem and multi-timescale phenomenon as language, those forces may
be difﬁcult to localize. On the one hand, it certainly is not enough to search for them
only at the level of individual mind/brain; on the other hand, taking all the relevant
systems and timescales into account might not be feasible in the process of theory
construction. Here, we limit ourselves to those processes that produce structuring
forces on the level of the individual and on the level of interaction, and limit the
time scales to those of ongoing interaction and cultural evolution, bracketing out
processes on different timescales while being aware of their presence. For a more
detailed discussion of the multisystemic and multi-timescale nature of language, see
Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi (2003, 2010, 2014) or Enﬁeld (2013). For how this inﬂuences
the form of linguistic theory, see Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi (2012)
while in adults the activation of neural structures responsible
for complementary and compensatory (and not only imita-
tive) movements have been demonstrated (van Schie et al., 2008;
Sartori et al., 2011). In the language domain models are pro-
posed for entraining antiphase in syllable rate for turn-taking
(Wilson and Wilson, 2006). Yet when it comes to the content
level of linguistic interaction, it seems that the mechanisms for
achieving complementarity are still not worked out. As said
earlier, priming and even more elaborate mechanisms for the
construction of common ground, because of their focus on mutu-
ality, will not explain the complementary aspect of this level of
communication.
We propose that in forming task-dependent dyadic systems, the
informational resource can be characterized as ‘pooled ground.’
This refers to the aggregate of the common ground and the rel-
evant privileged ground that may never enter common ground
(become mutual) yet is a basis for individual behavior inﬂu-
encing the dyad. To pool knowledge in coordinative situations,
language is thus used not only to conﬁrm a shared vision of a sit-
uation, but also to ‘scout’ for and signalize mutually unavailable
resources (information or skills), which would enable efﬁcient
functioning of the global system. The necessity of the concept
comes from changing perspective from the individual to the
dyadic level and acknowledging its distributed nature. It does
not matter if resources are shared, as long as one of the partic-
ipants makes them effective in the dyad’s dialog and, eventually,
behavior.
Here we use the ﬁrst two tenets of the synergetic approach,
mentioned in the introduction. By ascribing functionality to
the entire system, we analyze individual processes as parts of
this system. New variables – such as effectiveness or stabil-
ity of a system as a whole – become explanatory also for the
behaviors of the individual participants. The dyad, acting on
the basis of unshared information, is a qualitatively new sys-
tem, dependent on the interaction of the individual resources.
Meaning is made in interaction due to individually produced
constraints the bases of which might not be shared (i.e., the
private knowledge that is the reason for their production is
never expressed) but nevertheless bear on the behavior of the
system.
From this perspective, the situation of communication, unlike
in traditional psycholinguistic experiments, can be viewed not
as relying on common ground, with elements of privileged
ground distracting from perfect mutuality, but rather as rely-
ing on common ground with elements of privileged ground
enabling moves (actions and utterances) that are beneﬁcial for
the overall behavior of the system yet never entering the com-
mon ground. Language thus acts as a constraint on individual
and dyadic dynamics and, on the other hand, is an outcome
of dynamic processes within individuals and dyads (Ra˛czaszek-
Leonardi and Scott Kelso, 2008; Pattee and Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi,
2012).
Polanyi (1966, p. 6), in his Tacit Dimension, similarly describes
the process of apprehending knowledge:
“Our message had left something behind that we could not tell, and its
receptionmust rely on it that the person addressed will discover that which
we have not been able to communicate.”
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Or we may risk an even stronger claim: sometimes it is not
necessary that the person make the discovery; she might rely on a
partner having made it to make a next step in a joint reasoning.
Communicative acts effectuate idiosyncratic changes in interlocu-
tors, which will never be mutually available but which, in the
cases of good communication, may lead to desirable collaborative
outcomes.
The problem with the deﬁnition of the pooled ground lies in
specifying what is enough to be known about the knowledge of the
other to rely on it for the task: it is not the proposition, or any other
formof a piece of factual knowledge itself, but rather consequences
of acting upon it for the joint task. While the common ground
requires that A know x, B know x, and they both know that they
know x (Clark and Marshall, 1978; Clark, 1992, 1996), and while
privileged ground means that A does not know x, B knows x and
B knows that A does not know x, a task-dependent pooled ground
couldbedescribed asAnot knowing x, Bknowing x andAknowing
that B knows x8, which seems paradoxical without A knowing the
content of x.
However the paradox dissolves if – as in the presented
approach – language acts as a constraint, not as content car-
rier. The same expression may – to some extent –act differently
on each interlocutor. For A, it might be enough to receive a sig-
nal that B knows the information needed for a task to rely on
it. This is different from actually receiving this information; the
content of B’s knowledge does not enter the common ground.
Knowing the task constraints should help predict the use of
common (mutual) ground and the use of privileged (private)
ground, which could change dynamically during task-dependent
interaction.
The notion of pooled ground thus goes beyond common
ground. It also goes beyond“implicit common ground,” proposed
by Pickering and Garrod (2004). Their conception is very helpful
in ﬁnding mechanisms that establish common ground between
interlocutors: it points to the possibility of its arisingwithout infer-
ences about, or modeling, the interlocutors’ state of knowledge.
Instead, they claim, the implicit common ground arises automat-
ically in the interlocutors by being in the same culture, situation,
or task and being part of the same conversation (letting the same
words activate relevant information in each partner). It is therefore
a much more automatic and resource-cheap process than actually
drawing inferences about the other’s knowledge. This mechanism
takes into account the fact that the interlocutors are co-present on
many different timescales (in culture, in multiple social projects,
in a particular task, in a particular project within a task). The
world, as its best model (Brooks, 1990), acts on both interlocutors
alike.
What is still missing, again, is the distributed nature of the
dialogical system: a mechanism for specialization in a task and
bringing pooled, not only shared resources to bear on the dyad’s
effectiveness. The pooled ground concept is thus based on the fact
that different cultural and experiential history of the participants
8Contrary to common ground, where a strict interpretation assumes that “B knows
that A knows that B knows x,” in pooled ground this does not seem necessary. B does
not have to know that A knows that she knows x. For example, B may speak/behave
like an expert to A without knowing that she is one; however, she might also know
this and therefore design her expressions accordingly.
in an interaction will make the activated knowledge that guides
behavior different for each interlocutor. This has often been
viewed as a trouble, and possible cause of misunderstanding.
However, this very same fact is the dyad’s strength, allowing
for an optimal use of the potential resources. Thus, diversity
is for good and for ill: for good because the idiosyncrasy of
knowledge makes the knowledge base, upon which a dyad acts,
much broader; for ill because it inevitably leads to misunder-
standings and cases of miscommunication. It seems that much
research has been devoted to the causes of misunderstandings
treated as failures of communication, while in this light they
can be seen as inevitable consequences of scouting for broader
ground on which the interaction may build. Without misun-
derstandings, the discovery of relevant diversities would not be
possible.
The concept of pooled ground has perhaps a stronger afﬁnity to
what Brown-Schmidt, one of the very few researchers who strives
to go “beyond common and privileged ground” and toward task-
immersed interactions, has called “potential” common ground:
“(. . .) that interlocutors would treat the common ground status of
potential discourse referents as a gradient phenomenon sensitive to
various sources of information in the discourse context” (Brown-
Schmidt, 2012, p. 65). The trick is to make this potentiality exert
its inﬂuence without ever becoming common, leading to a truly
distributed, and thus economical system, functioning according
to the least collective effort principle.
APPLICATION: PERSPECTIVE-TAKING IN DIALOG
To summarize, the synergetic notion of dialog, which views
language as a system of constraints functionally controlling inter-
actions, has a potential of clarifying the relationship between the
two kinds of coordination previously recognized in dialog (Clark,
1996). The coordination on the linguistic level means establishing
controls that are appropriate for the coordinationon joint projects.
The principle of least collaborative effort pertains to both levels:
(i) enforcing the sparse (thrifty) use of constraints on an ongoing
dynamics, and making both partners contribute to their construc-
tion and (ii) distributing the roles to make the dyad less redundant
and more effectively using the resources, pooling them adequately
to the situation.
Adding the collective level of situated interaction to the
explanatory apparatus, with its qualitatively new resource in the
form of the pooled ground, allows to see in a different light some
of the recurrent problems in psycholinguistics. For the purpose
of this paper, we have chosen to focus on perspective-taking in
dialog. Perspective-taking is a case of a broader phenomenon in
dialog research, namely audience design, and after a detailed anal-
ysis of the former, we also draw implications for this more general
notion.
Factors that determine which perspective (allo- or egocentric)
is taken in a given moment of an interaction have been a sub-
ject of intense debate over the last 15 years. According to Clark
et al.’s (1983) theoretical proposition mentioned above, interlocu-
tors should immediately restrict their interpretations according
to the perspective of the interlocutor, narrowing it to the com-
mon ground. However, in the work of Keysar et al. (1998, 2000,
2003), this principle has been questioned by the results that show
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that addressees consider particular objects to be potential refer-
ents, even if these objects are not in common ground with the
speaker (not visible to the speaker). When the commands from the
speaker (e.g., “take a small candle”) were ambiguous and referred
to a mutually visible object as well as to an object hidden from the
speaker but visible to the addressee, participants in the addressee
role often ﬁxated on the hidden object ﬁrst, indicating that they
perceived it as a possible referent. The presence of a hidden seman-
tic competitor made the time of interpretation longer compared
to a situation without such a competitor. Sometimes, participants
showed even more ‘grave’ egocentric mistakes by reaching for, or
even grasping, the object in the privileged ground (Keysar et al.,
2000).
These results were interpreted as evidence for a default egocen-
tric perspective in communication. Keysar et al. (2000) proposed
a model of perspective-taking in dialog, a perspective-adjustment
model, in which interpretation is an egocentric process, with
mechanisms of late adjustment to the speaker’s perspective acti-
vated only in cases of misunderstanding. Additional evidence
for egocentric strategies in communication has been provided by
research on cognitive costs of perspective-taking. Lin et al. (2010)
showed that the ability to ignore the privately accessible part of
a visual area in conversation correlates with executive resources
such as working memory and inhibitory control. Other studies
have conﬁrmed that reasoning about others’ perspective indeed
might not be automatic, even for adults (Apperly et al., 2007),
which seemed to further support the egocentric model.
Despite their inﬂuence on interpretation theories, Keysar et al.’s
(2000, 2003) studies were criticized on methodological grounds.
As Hanna et al. (2003) noticed, objects in privileged ground which
had to be ignored by participants were chosen in Keysar’s setups
in such a manner that they were the best perceptual or semantic
match for the descriptions (for example, theywere themost typical
referents). Consequently, participants had to resolve two conﬂicts:
perspective discrepancy and lexical conﬂict. Lexical description
pointed to the most typical referent, while shared perspective
pointed to the less typical object visible for both participants. In
Hanna et al. (2003), where lexical competition was under con-
trol, results showed that participants focused mostly on the shared
objects, already from the beginning of the interpretation pro-
cess. Nonetheless, they did look at the semantic competitors in
privileged ground longer than at other irrelevant objects, so the
perspective information was not the only type of information that
determined behavior.
Accounting for these and other similar results which could
not be readily encompassed within the Keysar’s model, Hanna
et al. (2003), Hanna and Tanenhaus (2004) and Brown-Schmidt
and Hanna (2011) proposed and reﬁned a different model of
perspective-taking in dialog, namely the constraint-based model.
The model emphasizes the probabilistic and incremental nature
of the interpretation process, where, from the beginning, differ-
ent constraints (prosodic, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, etc.)
inﬂuence interpretation. The ﬁnal interpretation depends on the
strength of each constraint and on the competition among them.
It may happen that despite the active perspective-taking (being
in common ground) constraint, a stronger saliency constraint
wins at the beginning of the interpretation process, focusing
attention on the privileged but very salient object. Importantly, the
constraint-based model allows for embracing relevant inﬂuences
from different sources in the course of communication. Perhaps
even those that were traditionally neglected and that stem from
the joint nature of conversation.
This was shown in Duran and Dale’s (2014) recent study (see
also Duran et al., 2011). The goal was to show that both egocentric
and other-centric biases are simultaneously activated and compete
for expression. The likelihood of eventually choosing one over the
other depended, among other factors, on the information about
the speaker’s capabilities. In their task, participants were required
to interpret verbal instructions from a partner speaking from a
speciﬁc spatial location with respect to the study participant, who
directed them to select an object on a computer screen. Although
participants in interaction were not physically co-present, the spa-
tial referent was ostensibly visible to both the speaker and the
addressee, albeit from different angles. Occasionally, instructions
could be ambiguous with respect to which object (e.g., one on the
left or the other on the right, depending on whose perspective was
taken) should be selected.
Depending on additional information available on their part-
ner (they were informed that the partner was either real or
simulated), participants grounded interpretation either from their
own visual perspective (i.e., egocentric stance) or from the visual
perspective of their partner (i.e., other-centric stance). They did
the lattermore often if the speaker was known to be simulated, evi-
dently preferring the egocentric stance if they knew they interacted
with a live interlocutor who was able to (1) take their point of view
if necessary and (2) ask a clarifying question in case of equivoca-
tion. Thus, the behavior of the participants was congruent with
the least collaborative effort principle: putting less effort (egocen-
tric perspective) when some effort was expected to be shared by
a partner. In the case of a simulated partner, incapable of col-
laboration, other-centric responding was shown to be not only
more frequent but also faster. Additionally,measuring the shape of
response trajectories, the authors demonstrated that competition
from an egocentric tendency was weaker in this condition.
Duran and Dale (2014) also showed, compatibly with the
constraint-based model, that the data obtained were well
accounted for by a dynamicalmodel, in which the two perspectives
are deﬁned as attractors of individual dynamics. Attractors co-
exist, and which one is chosen depends on their relative strength,
which is inﬂuenced by the beliefs about the partner in interac-
tion. What is crucial, though, is that the speeds of the participants’
reactions and the form of their behavior (the shape of trajectories
for reaching the goal) were inﬂuenced by a mere presence of the
non-chosen attractor. This illustrates what was mentioned earlier:
information that potentially is relevant for the task andonly poten-
tially can enter common ground nevertheless exerts its inﬂuence
on the ongoing interaction.
The above shows how the dialogical, joint nature of conversa-
tion brings in valid and important constraints that, together with
the knowledge of common ground, co-determine the perspective
taken on a concrete scene. However, most of the experimental
work of Hanna and Tanenhaus (2004) and Brown-Schmidt and
Hanna (2011) as well as the work of Duran and Dale (2014) per-
tain to rather limited situations, congruentwith those traditionally
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studied in research on communication: agreeing on reference and
resolving ambiguities, where the task-relevant objects are – by
experimental situation design – presented in common ground. It
is worth noticing, as some already have (Brown-Schmidt, 2012),
that situations chosen for studies mostly involve interpretation
of descriptions or imperatives, which require focusing on com-
mon ground and rarely, for example, the informational questions,
which would require focusing on the privileged ground. Thus
again, the tasks were chosen to study how people understand each
other and not how they are able to form distributed functional
systems. Yet it seems logical that if linguistic interactions are to
broaden the capabilities of a dyad, it is precisely the private, or
privileged, information that should be in focus. In fact, in one
study by Brown-Schmidt (2009), participants were asked about
an object in their private ground with an informational ques-
tion. In this situation, they clearly focused more on the privileged
ground target than on the common ground competitor, showing
sensitivity to the speaker’s informational demands.
The power of an interacting system comes from its distributed
nature. Using the concept of pooled ground helps understand
how perspective taking may serve the global organization of a
dyad. If we look at most real-life situations from a global per-
spective of an interactive dyad, pooling the ground for a dyadic
system immersed in a task requires ﬁrst scouting for information
that potentially might be relevant for the task and volunteered
or signalized in a collaborative interaction and then zooming on
appropriate linguistic controls that coordinate this information.
Keysar et al.’s (1998, 2000, 2003) results, as well as the slight ini-
tial egocentric bias found in almost all the above studies, might
thus be taken not as evidence for egocentricity but as a prepara-
tion for being a valid partner in an interaction, able to contribute,
or signal, idiosyncratic information or competence. Experimen-
tal setups where the participant sees that some information is
blocked from the partner’s view lead to an increased responsibility
for this very information in this participant (he is the only one
who has access to it) and thus increases the tendency to focus on
it.
We thus see an increasing ﬂexibility in the models of
perspective-taking: from Clark’s automatic initial adjusting to
common ground (e.g., Clark and Carlson, 1981), or Keysar’s
automatic, initial egocentricity (e.g., Keysar et al., 1998) to the
constraint-based model of Hanna and Tanenhaus (2004) and
Brown-Schmidt (2009), where perspective-taking depends on
interaction of various factors (lexical, perspective of the part-
ner, capabilities of the partner). In the next step (in Duran
and Dale, 2014), the constraints are shown to be co-present and
dynamically inﬂuence perspective-taking decisions. This empha-
sizes the joint, dialogical, nature of communication and the
principle of the least collective effort. The synergetic model,
underscoring both the jointness and the distributed nature of
the conversing system, which requires pooling the participants’
resources, makes it possible to generalize the constraint-based
model to other situations than ambiguity resolution or agreeing-
on-reference, by letting various structures of the task determine
the shape of the linguistic exchange and thus better predict con-
versational moves and the focus of attention. This, however, is
possible only if we let the global level (the functional synergy)
exert its inﬂuence, determining the distribution of complementary
roles.
Rising to the level of interaction for explanatory variables has
consequences for the phenomenon of audience design in general,
of which perspective-taking is an example. The usual focus of
the studies is on the ability of the speaker to adjust the utterance
according to her beliefs about the knowledge or social status of
the listeners (Clark and Krych, 2004; Horton and Gerrig, 2005).
Addressees’ reactions are rich in cues about their conversational
needs, which has been elegantly demonstrated by Kuhlen and
Brennan’s (2013) work that led to questioning the validity of using
confederates in some studies of interactive dialog. For example, in
Brown and Dell (1987) experiment participants told a story to
an allegedly naïve partner, who in fact was a confederate. In that
case, participants were not eager to take the alleged addressees
needs into account, which was interpreted as a proof of egocen-
trism. However, in the Lockridge and Brennan (2002) replication,
when the confederate was replaced by an actual naïve partner who
heard a story for the ﬁrst time and who was allowed to give feed-
back to the speaker, participants showed sensitivity toward the
addressee’s lack of knowledge already in the early stages of utter-
ance production. This strong effect of the interlocutor presence
suggests that parties in a dialog are actually very skillful in estimat-
ing the knowledge and conversational needs of a partner during
dialog.
Focus on ‘doing together,’ however, leads one to ask a question
whether, perhaps, participants are equally skillful in recogniz-
ing potentialities and not only needs of the others. Isaacs and
Clark (1987), in their study on audience design, showed that
recognition of the expertise level with respect to the task mate-
rial is almost immediate, determining both experts’ and novices’
way of referring to objects. Perhaps the principle of least col-
laborative effort and the distributed nature of joint project
realization, with the notion of pooled ground, can thus be use-
ful also for generalizing principles of audience design: from
offering information to be understood to designing contribu-
tions to get what is needed for interaction to go further. Such
framework can be helpful in broadening the investigation of
interaction to the contexts beyond the tasks that require zoom-
ing in on the same reference in common ground. In other
contexts, audience design serves not only to supply informa-
tion but also to seek information from a more knowledge-
able partner: expressions are designed to get to the privileged
ground but only as much as is needed to make our own next
move.
CONCLUSION
Pragmatic approaches see language as immersed in a variety of
social projects. This perspective, taken in conjunction with dia-
logical and collective view on meaning-making, points to the fact
that realization of a project often requires the coordination of
distributed resources.
The notion that a global level of interaction may possess causal
and functional properties is advocated by enactive approaches to
cognition (Di Paolo et al., 2008) and, in the domain of linguis-
tic functioning, by the model of dialog as interpersonal synergy
(Fusaroli et al., 2014). At this level, with respect to collective goals,
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complementary roles for participants in a synergy are deﬁned.
Within such a framework, the use of language in interaction is
thus responsible not only for creating and maintaining coher-
ence and mutual understanding but also for distributing the roles
in a task-dependent and complementary fashion. To describe
the resource available to a dyad in this process, the notion of
‘pooled ground’ was proposed, which pertains to the level of
interaction as a whole and comprises both the mutually known
common ground and the elements of privileged grounds that
may enter the common ground or may never do so, neverthe-
less having a causal role in constraining the dialogical system’s
behavior.
Just as the alternative attractor in the Duran and Dale (2014)
study that exerted inﬂuence on the shape of reaching trajectories,
the privileged knowledge will have an inﬂuence on a speaker’s
utterances (both the content and the way they are made), making
them act slightly differently as constraints on the listener sim-
ply by virtue of being different physical controlling signals. This
brings us back to the distinction between the physical and the
semantic, which was made in note 3 at the beginning of this
paper: in the framework in which language is understood as a
constraint on an ongoing interaction, it is easier to see how the
physicality of an utterance may become meaningful in a given
situation.
The synergetic model leads to the reinterpretation of seem-
ingly egocentric behaviors in perspective-taking as dyad-oriented;
namely, they may stem from ‘scouting’ for useful task-relevant
information. Similarly, audience design of utterances should
be understood with respect to the joint project realized, and
not as motivated solely by understanding each other. The
emphasis on pooling and not equalizing the ground may
show in a different light the problem of misunderstand-
ings. They are a natural consequence of scouting for broader
resources; their appearance is not only a signal that some-
thing should be repaired but, equally valuably, a signal of a
potentially usable difference. They stem from constantly test-
ing privileged information that can be volunteered or sig-
nalized in an interaction. The collective, distributed sense-
making would thus not be possible without misunderstand-
ings.
Balancing the synchrony/complementarity factors in a syn-
ergy leads to novel predictions about communicative behavior.
It may, for example, be useful in determining the ‘degree of
novelty’ that will be accepted in a conversation. In a situation
of a strong need for group coherence, one might predict a heav-
ier redundancy, i.e., staying within common ground (an emphasis
on communion and the phatic aspect of an encounter) rather
than risking miscommunication while scouting for maximal
gain.
The theoretical and empirical focus in psycholinguistic stud-
ies exclusively on language, on linguistic exchanges and their
‘understanding,’ leads to underappreciation of a richly struc-
tured interaction constrained by many factors being already in
place. Viewing linguistic interactions ﬁrst as interactions on joint
projects, with language as a source of constraints that struc-
ture them and divide labor, removes the explanatory burden of
meaning-making, and understanding from language alone and
poses it in the study of interaction in its context. With the pooled
ground over both participants as resource, these interactions, as
distributed collective structures, can be truly richer and more able
than each of the participants alone.
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